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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
treatment of disease," the "physician" in charge shall specify, for entry in
the record, the nature of the disease, and where in his opinion it was con-
tracted; the court takes the position that the information is confidential.' 4
This is sound since there is always a presumption that municipal author-
ities lawfully discharge their official duties in compliance with the statutes, 5
and for the further reason that information obtained from a person ad-
mitted to the hospital for the "medical treatment of disease," is obviously
information necessary to enable the physician to prescribe for the patient,
such as the statute makes confidential.16 Indeed, where the relation is es-
tablished, it will be presumed that any information imparted to the physi-
cian by the patient is necessary for proper treatment in a professional
capacity.1 '
The remaining contention is that the question of privilege was waived
by plaintiff's opening statement at the trial. Parties are bound by the ad-
missions of their counsel during trial, of facts material to the issue, as such
admissions dispense with the necessity of proving the doubtful fact.'5 But
a mere preliminary outline by counsel of what he expects the evidence will
be, is not a solemn admission to take the place of proof.' 9 The principal
case is within this rule since no reference was made, or evidence introduced,
to show the treatment received or condition of the insured as a patient in
the hospital.20 Indeed the issues in a case are made by the pleadings and
not by opening statements, and the fact that counsel does not object does
not enlarge or change the pleadings. 2' If such were not the rule, it would
be often difficult to know what were the real issues in the case.22
It is submitted that the principal case is a step forward in Missouri prac-
tice and well within the language of the statutes involved and the adjudi-
cated cases.
J. L. A. '37.
FOODS-FOREIGN SUBSTANCE-NEGLIGENE.-In a recent case the plain-
tiff became ill from drinking part of a bottle of Cocoa-Cola which was found
to contain glass. The Arkansas Supreme Court held it to be a question of
14 Vermillion v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, (1936 Mo. App.)
93 S. W. (2d) 45; R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 9056; Mo. St. Ann. par. 9056, p. 4196.
15 Wiget v. City of St. Louis, (1935 Mo. Sup.) 85 S. W. (2d) 1038;
State ex rel Ball v. State Board of Health (1930 Mo. Sup.) 26 S. W. (2d)
773.
16R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 1731; Mo. St. Ann. par. 1731, p. 4011.
17 State v. Kennedy (1903) 177 Mo. 98, 75 S. W. 979.
Is Pratt v. Conway (1898) 148 Mo. 291, 49 S. W. 1028; Fillingham v.
St. Louis Transit Co. (1903) 102 Mo. App. 573, 77 S. W. 314; Oscanyan
v. Winchester Arms Co. (1880) 103 U. S. 261.
19 Russ v. Railroad Co. (1892) 112 Mo. 45, 20 S. W. 472; Fillingham
v. St. Louis Transit Co. supra, note 18.20 Vermillion v. Prudential Insurance Co., supra, note 14.
22 Moore v. Dawson (1925) 220 Mo. App. 791, 277 S. W. 58.
22 Supra, note 20; Davis v. Calvert, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 269, 25 Am. Dec.
282 1. c. 299; Fox v. Peninsular Works, (1891) 84 Mich. 676, 1. c. 680, 48
N. W. 203; Minchin v. Minchin, (1892) 157 Mass. 265, 32 N. E. 164.
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negligence for the jury., In St. Louis, Missouri, an infant drank milk from
a bottle sold to the infant's mother by a dairy company and was injured
by the presence of glass in the milk.2 Both the Arkansas and the Missouri
courts concurred that negligence was the basis of recovery 3 although the
verdict for plaintiff in the Missouri case was set aside because of error in
instructions on a collateral point.4
The proper basis of recovery for injuries resulting from food or bever-
ages containing harmful foreign substances is a matter of difference among
the states.5 Food has been the object of special solicitude by the law from
early times. English statutes as early as 1266 suggest that the sale of
victuals differed from the sale of other articles in that the vendor of food
might be held liable without a showing of fraud.6 Food is the subject of
modern legislation to insure its purity and proper handling,7 and is recog-
nized as within that class of articles imminently dangerous to human life
thereby coming within an exception to the rule that a manufacturer or
seller of a defective article is not liable for injuries to the person or property
of an ultimate consumer who purchased from a middleman.8
Two positions have been taken by the courts. The majority adhere to
the doctrine of negligence as the proper basis for liability9 while the minor-
ity base liability on the rule of implied warranty of fitness.20 This latter
theory remained merely dicta in the United States for a long while after
being introduced in the case of Van Bracklin v. Fonda (1815), 12 Johns
468, as an exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor." Because an action
based upon a warranty is generally looked upon as a contract action, there
was some difficulty in stretching this theory to cover the case of a pur-
l Coca Cola Bottling Co. et al. v. Hill (1936 Ark.) 90 S. W. (2d) 210.
2 Hickman v. St. Louis Dairy Co. (1936 Mo.) 90 S. W. (2d) 177.
3 Supra, note 1.
4 Supra, iote 2.
5 2OVirginia Law Review 921.
6 5 Iowa raw Bulletin 6, 36.
7 R. S. Mo. 1929, sections 13003 et seq.
82 Cooley On Torts (3rd ed.) 486 et seq.; 17 A. L. R. 669 note.
9 Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark (1921) 205 Ala. 678, 89
So. 64; Enloe v. Charlotte Coca Cola Bottling Co. (1935) 208 N. C. 305, 180
S. E. 583; Crigger v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. (1915) 132 Tenn. 545, 179
S. W. 155; Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Barksdale (1920) 17 Ala. App. 606, 88
So. 36; Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. McBride (1929) 180 Ark. 193; 20 S. W.
(2d) 862; Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jenkins (1935) 190 Ark. 930, 82 S. W.
(2) 15; Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Rowland (1932) 16 Tenn. App. 184, 66
S. W. (2) 272; Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Ark. v. Adcox (1934) 189 Ark.
610, 74 S. W. (2) 771; Aron & Co. v. Sills (1924) 206 N. Y. Supp. 695; An-
heuser-Busch, Inc. v. Southard (1935) 84 S. W. (2) 89.
10 Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co. (1920) 189 Ia. 775, 176 N. W. 382;
Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Lyons (1920) 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 225; Coca
Cola Bottling Works v. Simpson (1930) 130 So. 479; Scruggins v. Jones
(1925) 20 Ky. 636, 269 S. W. 743; Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co. 182 N. Y.
Supp. 459, 192 App. Div. 186 held that the purchaser of a cake containing
wire could sue the manufacturer for negligence as well as breach of implied
warranty. 23 Kentucky Law Journal 534.
15 Iowa Law Bulletin 6, 36.
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chaser from a middleman because of the absence of privity between the
parties. 2 The courts have supplied this technical deficiency by saying,
"When a manufacturer makes bottles and sells to the retail trade, to be
again sold to the general public, a beverage represented to be refreshing and
harmless, he is under a legal duty to see it that in the process of bottling
no foreign substance shall be mixed with the beverage, which, if taken into
the stomach, will be injurious."'13
Some courts suggest that the manufacturer's warranty that his goods are
fit for consumption is one which runs with the goods.14 These courts recog-
nize that logic may not justify the holding and that the result may be to
make the manufacturer an insurer of his product." This holding, however,
is in line with the present tendency of the law to impose liability on those
who can best bear the loss, in the light of the exigencies of social needs.' 6
The dominant line of cases holds that the proper basis for recovery is
in tort for negligence.17 Here too, privity was a troublesome question, but
it has been definitely settled that a manufacturer is answerable for his neg-
ligence even to those who have no privity of contract with him.' 8 The courts
which recognize negligence as the basis of liability differ as to what con-
stitutes sufficient evidence to maintain plaintiff's case. Some hold the mere
presence of impurities in the food is not evidence of negligence;' 9 others,
that the presence of impurities does give rise to such an inference. 20 Still
12 12 Michigan Law Review 919. Salle v. Light (1827) 4 Ala. 700, an
early case holding there can be no recovery by consumer from the manu-
facturer on implied warranty because of lack of privity.
13 Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co. (1905) 124 Ga. 121. Italics supplied.
14 Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co. (1916) 171 N. C. 33, 87 S. E.
958; Catani v. Swift & Co. (1915) 251 Pac. 52; Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling
Works (1914) 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S. W. 80; Mazetti v. Armour & Co. (1913)
75 Wash. 622; Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino (1928) 27 Ohio App. 475, 161
N. E. 557 hold that the manufacturer's warranty to the retailer inures to
the benefit of the consumer.
15 Parks v. Pie Co. (1914) 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202; Watson v. Augusta
Brewing Co. (1905) 124 Ga. 121, 52 S. E. 152, 1 Williston On Sales (2nd
ed.) 239. 20 Minnesota Law Review 527. Smith v. Carlos (1923) 215 Mo.
App. 488, 247 S. W. 468, holds that necessity requires that public purveyors
of food, such as restauranteurs be held as insurers against injury occa-
sioned by their failure to furnish pure and wholesome food. Opposite view
shown in Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard (1935) 208 N. C. 1, 179, S. E.
30 which says that the manufacturer of food for human consumption is
liable for failure to exercise a high degree of care in the manufacture and
preparation of the food, but is not an insurer of his product.
16 Pound, 27 Harvard Law Review 195, 233.
17 Supra, note 9.
18 5 Iowa Law Bulletin 6, 36. Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling Works (1914)
132 Tenn. 231 sums up the stand taken by the courts when it says, "practi-
cally all the modern cases are to the effect that the ultimate consumer of
foods . . . may bring his action against the manufacturer for injuries
caused by the negligent preparation of such articles." Coca Cola Bottling
Co. v. Barksdale (1920) 17 Ala. App. 606, 88 So. 36.
19 20 Virginia Law Review 921; Swenson v. Purity Baking Co. (1929)
183 Minn. 289, 236 N. W. 310.
20 Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Schneider (1933) 249 Ky. 261, 60
S. W. (2d) 594; O'Brien v. Louis K. Liggett Co. (1933) 282 Mass. 438, 185
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others have held that proof of the presence of foreign matter in food or
beverages warrants recovery on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.21 Because
of the difficulties of proving that the agency causing the injury was under
the exclusive control of the defendant; that the injury was one which would
not ordinarily occur if the defendant had used due care; and, that evidence
of the cause of the injury is more readily available to defendant than plain-
tiff, this doctrine is not generally used. 22 Most courts take the view that the
presence of such foreign matter as glass, in itself, is evidence of negligence,
'hence there is no need for the doctrine of 'es ipsa loquitor, for the case is one
for the jury without its aid.2 3 Direct proof of actionable negligence on the
part of the defendant is not required, however, since such negligence may
be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances. 24  E. C. '37.
INJUNCTION-ENJOINING THE PROSECUTION OF A SUIT IN ANOTHER URIS-
DICTION.-In the case of McConnell v. Thomson1 the appellant, an Indiana
citizen, was enjoined from prosecuting a threatened action in the city of
St. Louis, Missouri, to recover damages under the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act2 on account of injuries alleged to have caused the death of appel-
lant's deceased husband while he was in the employ of the appellee. The
alleged tort took place in Patoka, Indiana. All the witnesses and records
were at Evansville, Indiana. Held, the Indiana equity courts may enjoin
the prosecution of actions in other states where it is shown that it would
be inequitable for the action to be brought in another jurisdiction.
The general rule is that where a party to a suit is within the jurisdic-
tion of one court he may, "on a proper showing," be enjoined from prose-
-cuting an action in a court of another state.3 The power to so enjoin a citi-
zen rests upon the power of equity to act in per'sonam,' for the court sim-
-ply enjoins the person from prosecuting the suit and not the foreign court
from trying the suit.5 A court will not issue an injunction to restrain an
N. E. 28; Minutilla v. Province Ice Cream Co. (1929) 50 R. I. 43, 144 Atl.
884; Bourcheix v. Willow Brook Dairy (1935) 268 N. Y. 1, takes the view
that the presence of glass in a bottle of cream in violation of a statute pro-
hibiting the sale of adulterated cream constituted negligence as a matter
-of law.
21 Eisenbeiss v. Payne (1933 Ariz.) 25 P. (2d) 161; Atlanta Coca Cola
Bottling Co. v. Sinyard (1932) 45 Ga. 272, 164 S. E. 231; Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co. v. Rankin (1932) 346 Ky. 65, 54 S. W. (2) 612.
22 20 Minnesota Law Review 527; Enloe v. Charlotte Coca Cola Bottling
-Co. (1926) 208 N. C. 305, 180 S. E. 582.
23 23 Michigan Law Review 785.24 Enloe v. Charlotte Coca Cola Bottling Co. (1935) 208 N. C. 305, 180
S. E. 582; Hampton v. Thomasville Coca Cola Bottling Co. (1935) 208
N. C. 331, 180 S. E. 584.
1 (Feb. 18, 1936) 200 N. E. 96.
2 45 U. S. C. A. secs. 51-59 and particularly sec. 56.
3 14 R. C. L. 412.
4 O'Haire v. Burns (1909) 45 Colo. 432, 101 Pac. 755, 132 A. S. R. 191,
25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 267 and note.
5 Gordon v. Munn (1910) 81 Kans. 537, 106 Pacific 286, 25 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 917.
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